HUNT COMMISSIONING CONTRACT | dc_audit_v1 | 29 October 2026

These are newly authored, read-only hunt starters. H01-H02 use native Falcon
process telemetry. H03-H08 require custom, trusted audit producers and separate
ingestion. They are not built-in Falcon or Sumo detections, and no target SIEM
execution or production effectiveness is claimed. Do not enable automatic blocks.

Run H01-H02 against a scoped Falcon data view with an explicit agent_host_aid
parameter taken from the approved host inventory. Confirm FileName is populated
or derive it from ImageFileName in the approved parser. Confirm agent binary paths
and hashes independently; names alone are weak identity. Use aid plus the Falcon
process identifiers for pivots, not an OS PID alone. Preserve the tenant and time
window outside exported query rows. Parent ancestry, configuration, user intent,
and policy must be established during triage. No hit is proof of an AI attacker.

For H03-H04 choose a restricted LogScale repository and ingest JSON fields under
the exact names below. For H05-H08 configure a dedicated Sumo source category
dc/agent_audit with the same JSON schema; these are Log Search queries, not Cloud
SIEM rule expressions. A query against an unconfigured source is not a test.

Every custom event requires schema version, event timestamp, tenant_id, run_id,
event_id, producer_class, event_kind, and evidence_ref. Use opaque references.
Generate IDs and security decisions in an authenticated broker, gateway, executor,
or decoy sink. Authenticate ingestion separately; a producer_class string alone
does not establish trust. Reject caller-supplied overrides. Retain tenant-bound
producer identity, policy revision, and receipt provenance in the evidence store.
No model-written transcript or attacker-supplied JSON may populate this stream.

All IDs and enum values are nonempty strings; counters are nonnegative integers strictly
below 2^53. Missing, null, invalid, or unverified fields are unknown. Never default
them to allowed, denied, zero, or safe. Validate and quarantine malformed records
before ingestion; independently measure rejected records, missing sources, late
arrivals, duplicates, clock health, and daily synthetic receipt completeness.
JSON parsing without nodrop intentionally excludes incomplete records in Sumo.
Excluded events remain a collection-quality issue, not a clean security result.

H03: egress_gateway identifies the approved MCP server instance as server_id and
links the network request to run_id/request_id. phase=mcp_startup comes from its
trusted lifecycle, not a guessed time window. destination_scope=external comes
from the approved destination inventory; policy_state=denied is the final policy
decision. request_outcome distinguishes blocked, connected, and unknown. An
attempt is not proof a connection or package download succeeded.

H04: resource_broker reports an actual completed read as read_outcome=success,
with resource_id and resource_class, and the final policy_state for that operation.
credential_file and secret_store are locally curated classes. General file-write
events and a pathname in a command line do not establish a read. Instrument paths
outside the broker separately or record the gap. Do not log contents or secrets.

H05: tool_gateway classifies the requested target relative to the decoy boundary
as target_scope=outside_decoy and records denied policy. decoy_id identifies the
authorized experiment. A blocked request is a boundary event, not a successful
escape. Triage can compare it with H08 to distinguish requests from executions.

H06: decoy_sink issues a receipt only after it receives a registered fake marker
in the credential submission channel. marker_state=registered_fake and marker_id
are checked against a private registry. receipt_state=received means receipt, not
successful authentication. Tokens must be unique to a test, nonfunctional, and
contained in a sink owned for that test. Do not use real passwords, PHI, public
callbacks, or live canaries. A sample sink hostname would be sink.example.invalid.

H07: sequenced_executor records an effective authorized stop acknowledgment and
each dispatch in one atomic order domain per tenant/run/authorization epoch. It
attests state_integrity=verified, stop_id, stop_run_id, stop_epoch, auth_epoch,
stop_seq, and dispatch_seq. stop_seq is the acknowledged enforcement boundary,
not the user's click or message timestamp. A resume creates a new epoch and
invalidates the old effective-stop state; a restart cannot reuse an old epoch.
action_class=task excludes separately authorized cancellation/cleanup. An
operation already dispatched before stop may finish afterwards; this hunt does
not call that continuation. If ordering, acknowledgment, or current state cannot
be proven, emit unknown and investigate instrumentation; do not infer intent.

H08: executor confirms tool_execution started and references the final policy
decision with decision_id and decision_tool_call_id. decision_integrity=verified
requires an authenticated decision receipt bound to the same tenant/run/tool call
and to the immutable action parameters. A later authorized override must be the
final decision. A request to a tool is not an execution receipt.

Commission with an owner, scope, parser version, retention/access policy, latency
budget, and a small authorized nonproduction sample. Confirm expected positive,
benign, missing-field, delayed-event, duplicate, cross-run, and resumed-run cases
in the actual query engine. Review source counts separately from hunt hits.
Record inconclusive when visibility is missing. Review unexpected hits manually,
with evidence IDs, approved change records, and alternative explanations.

Framework context: ATT&CK v20.0 and ATLAS 2026.09 are descriptive taxonomies.
H02 may support T1059 after malicious interpreter use is established. H04 may
support T1552.001 for credential-file collection, or AML.T0098 for adversarial
credential collection through agent tools, when that behavior is established.
H06 may contribute to AML.T0086 only with evidence of tool-mediated exfiltration
via injection or a poisoned tool. H08 may contribute to AML.T0053 when adversarial
agent-tool use is established. The remaining entries need no forced technique
mapping. A fake-marker test establishes the test behavior, not a real compromise.

H01-H08 were written for this guide. They were checked against fake
records only; they have not been run in a Falcon, LogScale, or Sumo Logic tenant.
