Agent-workflow hunts: start with endpoint evidence
Customer telemetry refresh / October 29, 2026
Choose your source
AI agent hunting: native telemetry first / 29 October 2026 START HERE Pick your existing platform, set a narrow window, and obtain an approved host, runner path/hash, account, owner, and permitted-work inventory. Inventory is operator context, not a package-defined event producer. Run a harmless known process and check that the expected event and required fields arrive first. H01/H02: Falcon process hunts; set agent_host_aid. Confirm FileName extraction or use the documented ImageFileName full-path suffix. Falcon sensor telemetry and search entitlement/retention are required; an alert-only feed is insufficient. N01/N02/N03: Defender process hunts and process-instance network pivot. Set actual device ID. For N03 copy the real process ID and creation time from its process event. The sample old date and ID intentionally produce no useful result. N04: Sumo raw-FDR process search. N05: Splunk raw-FDR process search. Both need an active FDR subscription and raw-event export/ingestion, not only Falcon alerts. Replace the source category/index and aid; confirm top-level JSON event keys or adjust the extraction paths for the actual transport wrapper. No dc schema. N06/N07: Sophos Live Discover ENDPOINT editor. Current snapshots only, not Data Lake event history. Verify table support and EDR/XDR entitlement locally. S01/S02: standard experimental Sigma process-creation rules. Map Image and ParentImage to complete executable paths in your backend; scope approved hosts. Do not substitute generic node/python names for authenticated runner inventory. INTERPRETATION Baseline the actual permitted workload. A process command mentioning a file is not a file read. A flag is not proof of its effective mode. Names are not trusted AI identity. A socket or network event is not credential submission or completed exfiltration. Missing data is unknown, never a clean bill of health. These searches do not block. Triage parent identity and expected work before raising an incident. Avoid exporting secrets, raw prompts, document contents, or identifying data. ADVANCED ENGINEERING H03-H08 and 00-audit-contract.txt are retained engineering designs requiring new authenticated gateway, broker, executor, and decoy audit producers. They are not stock endpoint telemetry, shipped product coverage, or the first-use route. Implement and commission those producers before evaluating their semantics. VALIDATION See VALIDATION.txt for the exact completed checks and limits. No live customer tenant, native query engine, installed-agent enforcement, blocking, or production coverage test is asserted. Safe local fixtures are synthetic and grant no access.
Native queries and standard rules
Replace the named source selector with the source you actually collect. Review prerequisites before running a hunt.
H01-falcon-permission-mode.logscale
// H01: native Falcon process hunt; select an inventoried agent host.
// Starter only. Tenant parser, argv, and policy checks are required.
#event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2 aid=?agent_host_aid
| FileName=/^claude(\.exe)?$/i
| CommandLine=/(^|\s)--(dangerously-skip-permissions(\s|$)|permission-mode(=|\s+)bypassPermissions(\s|$))/
| select([@timestamp, aid, TargetProcessId, ParentBaseFileName,
ImageFileName, CommandLine])
H02-falcon-agent-shell.logscale
// H02: native Falcon process hunt; baseline expected agent shell use.
// Confirm parent path/hash against inventory before labeling an agent.
#event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2 aid=?agent_host_aid
| ParentBaseFileName=/^(claude|codex|copilot)(\.exe)?$/i
| FileName=/^(cmd|powershell|pwsh|bash|sh|zsh|dash|fish|wsl)(\.exe)?$/i
| select([@timestamp, aid, TargetProcessId, ParentProcessId,
ParentBaseFileName, ImageFileName, CommandLine])
N01-mde-permission-mode.kql
// Set DeviceId from approved inventory and a narrow time window.
let agent_device_id = "REPLACE_WITH_DEVICE_ID";
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(1d) and DeviceId == agent_device_id
| where FileName in~ ("claude", "claude.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(^|\s)--(dangerously-skip-permissions(\s|$)|permission-mode(=|\s+)bypassPermissions(\s|$))"
| project Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName,
ProcessId, ProcessCreationTime, InitiatingProcessFileName,
FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine
N02-mde-agent-shell.kql
let agent_device_id = "REPLACE_WITH_DEVICE_ID";
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(1d) and DeviceId == agent_device_id
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("claude", "claude.exe",
"codex", "codex.exe", "copilot", "copilot.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe",
"pwsh", "bash", "sh", "zsh", "dash", "fish", "wsl.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName,
ProcessId, ProcessCreationTime, ProcessCommandLine,
InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath,
InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessCreationTime
N03-mde-process-network.kql
// Copy all three values from the identified process event.
let agent_device_id = "REPLACE_WITH_DEVICE_ID";
let selected_pid = long(123456789);
let selected_start = datetime(2000-01-01T00:00:00Z);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(1d) and DeviceId == agent_device_id
| where InitiatingProcessId == selected_pid
| where InitiatingProcessCreationTime == selected_start
| project Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, ActionType,
InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessId,
InitiatingProcessCreationTime, RemoteIP, RemotePort, RemoteUrl
N04-sumo-fdr-agent-shell.sumo
// Replace category and aid with your real FDR source and inventory.
_sourceCategory="REPLACE_WITH_FDR_CATEGORY"
| json "event_simpleName", "aid", "ParentBaseFileName",
"ImageFileName" as event_name, host_aid, parent_name, image_path
| where event_name = "ProcessRollup2"
and host_aid = "REPLACE_WITH_AID"
| where parent_name matches /(?i)^(claude|codex|copilot)(\.exe)?$/
| where image_path matches /(?i)[\\\/](cmd|powershell|pwsh|bash|sh|zsh|dash|fish|wsl)(\.exe)?$/
| json "CommandLine" as command_line nodrop
| fields _messagetime, host_aid, parent_name, image_path, command_line
N05-splunk-fdr-agent-shell.spl
index=REPLACE_WITH_FDR_INDEX earliest=-1d
| spath path=event_simpleName output=event_name
| spath path=aid output=host_aid
| spath path=ParentBaseFileName output=parent_name
| spath path=ImageFileName output=image_path
| spath path=CommandLine output=command_line
| where event_name="ProcessRollup2"
AND host_aid="REPLACE_WITH_AID"
| where match(parent_name,"(?i)^(claude|codex|copilot)(\.exe)?$")
| where match(image_path,"(?i)[\\\\/](cmd|powershell|pwsh|bash|sh|zsh|dash|fish|wsl)(\.exe)?$")
| table _time host_aid parent_name image_path command_line
N06-sophos-live-agent-shell.sql
-- Live Discover endpoint query, not a Data Lake history query.
SELECT c.pid, c.parent, c.name, c.path, c.cmdline, c.start_time,
p.name AS parent_name, p.path AS parent_path,
p.start_time AS parent_start_time
FROM processes AS c
JOIN processes AS p ON c.parent = p.pid
WHERE lower(p.name) IN ('claude','claude.exe','codex','codex.exe',
'copilot','copilot.exe')
AND c.start_time > 0 AND p.start_time > 0
AND p.start_time <= c.start_time
AND lower(c.name) IN ('cmd.exe','powershell.exe','pwsh.exe',
'pwsh','bash','sh','zsh','dash','fish','wsl.exe');
N07-sophos-live-agent-sockets.sql
-- Current open sockets, not connection history or successful exfiltration.
SELECT p.pid, p.name, p.path, s.remote_address, s.remote_port,
s.local_address, s.local_port
FROM processes AS p
JOIN process_open_sockets AS s ON p.pid = s.pid
WHERE lower(p.name) IN ('claude','claude.exe','codex','codex.exe',
'copilot','copilot.exe')
AND s.remote_port > 0;
S01-sigma-windows-agent-shell.yml
title: 'Agent Named Parent Starting a Command Interpreter (Windows)'
id: '28d4c52c-3f69-4dde-9ddb-a07ce1c71491'
status: 'experimental'
description: 'Review process creation on approved agent hosts. Names require inventory verification; this rule does not prove AI identity or a policy breach.'
author: 'Deception Check'
date: '2026-10-29'
logsource:
category: 'process_creation'
product: 'windows'
detection:
selection_parent:
ParentImage|endswith:
- '\claude.exe'
- '\codex.exe'
- '\copilot.exe'
selection_shell:
Image|endswith:
- '\cmd.exe'
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- '\wsl.exe'
condition: 'selection_parent and selection_shell'
falsepositives:
- 'Approved development, build, support, and test workflows'
level: 'informational'
S02-sigma-linux-agent-shell.yml
title: 'Agent Named Parent Starting a Command Interpreter (Linux)'
id: '28d4c52c-3f69-4dde-9ddb-a07ce1c71492'
status: 'experimental'
description: 'Review process creation on approved agent hosts. Names require inventory verification; this rule does not prove AI identity or a policy breach.'
author: 'Deception Check'
date: '2026-10-29'
logsource:
category: 'process_creation'
product: 'linux'
detection:
selection_parent:
ParentImage|endswith:
- '/claude'
- '/codex'
- '/copilot'
selection_shell:
Image|endswith:
- '/bash'
- '/sh'
- '/zsh'
- '/dash'
- '/fish'
- '/pwsh'
condition: 'selection_parent and selection_shell'
falsepositives:
- 'Approved development, build, support, and test workflows'
level: 'informational'
Advanced engineering
Broker decisions, authenticated task boundaries, and decoy reads need trusted instrumentation. Those H03-H08 rules are preserved in the advanced material, not presented as stock endpoint coverage.