title: Entra ID Credential Related Audit Event with Application Actor
id: c90ce13e-ae7b-463a-a89f-4054cf18bc70
status: experimental
description: >-
  Review lead for credential-related audit events with a nonempty app actor ID.
  Includes removal/rotation and all results; does not prove a credential was added
  or abuse occurred. Read skykick-base-logic.txt for mapping and coverage limits.
references:
  - https://sigmahq.io/sigma-specification/specification/sigma-appendix-taxonomy.html
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/reference/tables/auditlogs
author: Deception Check
date: '2026-10-19'
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: auditlogs
    definition: >-
      Microsoft AuditLogs spelling; conversion must extract nested InitiatedBy.app
      fields as strings. Dotted field names require a validated backend mapping.
detection:
    selection_operation:
        OperationName|contains:
            - 'Certificates and secrets'
            - 'service principal credentials'
    selection_actor:
        - InitiatedBy.app.appId: '?*'
        - InitiatedBy.app.servicePrincipalId: '?*'
    condition: selection_operation and selection_actor
fields: [TimeGenerated, AADTenantId, Id, CorrelationId, OperationName, Result,
    ResultReason, InitiatedBy, TargetResources]
falsepositives:
    - Approved application credential rotation by CI/CD or infrastructure automation
    - Authorized vendor onboarding, credential removal, or remediation
    - System-initiated activity represented by an application identity
level: medium
tags: [attack.persistence, attack.t1098.001]
