title: Entra ID Role Addition Related Audit Event with Application Actor
id: 7d6f9b4e-4976-41d6-a12e-f1b7f90c4813
status: experimental
description: >-
  Review lead for role-addition-related audit events with a nonempty app actor ID.
  Includes requests, cancellations, and all results; does not prove self-assignment
  or compromise. Read skykick-base-logic.txt for mapping and coverage limits.
references:
  - https://sigmahq.io/sigma-specification/specification/sigma-appendix-taxonomy.html
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/reference/tables/auditlogs
author: Deception Check
date: '2026-10-19'
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: auditlogs
    definition: >-
      Microsoft AuditLogs spelling; conversion must extract nested InitiatedBy.app
      fields as strings. Dotted field names require a validated backend mapping.
detection:
    selection_operation:
        OperationName|contains: 'member to role'
    selection_actor:
        - InitiatedBy.app.appId: '?*'
        - InitiatedBy.app.servicePrincipalId: '?*'
    condition: selection_operation and selection_actor
fields: [TimeGenerated, AADTenantId, Id, CorrelationId, OperationName, Result,
    ResultReason, InitiatedBy, TargetResources]
falsepositives:
    - Authorized vendor onboarding and application automation that assigns roles
    - Legitimate PIM requests, eligibility changes, approvals, and cancellations
    - System-initiated activity represented by an application identity
level: medium
tags: [attack.persistence, attack.privilege_escalation, attack.t1098.003]
