# Customer process and ESXi logging hunts

Start with the [coverage matrix](COVERAGE.md), the [Linux source guide](guides/linux-sources.md), or the [ESXi source guide](guides/esxi-sources.md). The machine-readable [customer catalog](customer-catalog.json) lists actual files and prerequisites for each check.

Five conventional Sigma rules use linux/process_creation and documented Image, ParentImage, CommandLine, and User fields. D4 is split into shell and temporary-executable variants. There is no required Deception Check data schema, custom finding feed, invented lineage flag, or stock dc_* table. Missing required source fields prevent the affected hunt from evaluating; investigate the source gap rather than treating silence as a clean result.

D1 and the ESXi D2 companion operate on real forwarded shell records. D3 is a stateful collector-monitor engineering design, not a portable Sigma absence rule. D5 is deliberately narrower than proving a privilege transition: it observes a root-account web child. Each platform's source and identity semantics are stated explicitly; the pack does not claim parity where a source is unavailable.

These are reviewed hunt starters for local deployment and tuning, not proven CVE signatures. No command string from a fixture is executed. No exploit, production scan, tenant query, connector deployment, publication, or scheduling was performed. [VALIDATION.md](VALIDATION.md) separates parser/backend conversion, synthetic fixtures, SQLite tests, and native execution status. Follow the [distribution checklist](DISTRIBUTION-CHECKLIST.md) before distributing or enabling modified copies.

YARA is not supplied because no validated malicious byte artifact is part of this pack. Snort/Suricata rules are not supplied: blanket PHP, IPsec, or SSH port matches would not identify the administrator logging bypass or local kernel write. Network evidence can corroborate activity; it does not establish these CVEs.
