Ivanti’s new fixes do not end the credential investigation.
A software update closes a vulnerability. It does not revoke a password or recovery key an attacker already took.
What changed since our October 14 note
Ivanti’s October 29 advisory update provides fixes for the two companion vulnerabilities in the chain Volexity investigated earlier this month. CISA added both to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on October 30. That is the new development: the separate root-escalation fix we previously described as pending is now available. Ivanti advisory; CISA catalog.
Can you show both the fix and the investigation?
Record the running build that covers the chain. Separately establish which identities and secrets the gateway could expose, what evidence was reviewed, and which recovery actions were verified.
Our earlier response note explains why a clean integrity check is not an all-clear. This update adds the companion-fix mapping and a practical closeout worksheet.
From the login page to full device control
Connect Secure is a remote-access VPN gateway: it lets approved people connect to an internal network. Volexity described attackers combining three weaknesses to run commands without a valid login and obtain root, the highest operating-system privilege. The individual prerequisites differ; the combined path removes the need for an attacker to start with an account.
Bypass the front door
Reach protected handlers through the unauthenticated entry path.
Know where the file lands
Predictable identifiers let the attacker place content at a known location on disk.
Raise access to root
A separate missing-authentication weakness enables local privilege escalation.
In the investigated case, the actor collected directory credentials, Windows local-administrator password data, BitLocker recovery information, and other material useful for moving deeper. It repeatedly used the exploit channel, operated partly in memory, and attempted selective log cleanup. Temporary files and a renamed packet sniffer were also present. Volexity’s investigation.
Volexity traces activity to a device then running the available patches.
The entry-point CVE and the incident investigation become public.
Ivanti’s updated advisory lists fixes for the two companion CVEs.
CISA adds CVE-2026-111357 and CVE-2026-118527.
Check the companion fix as well as the entry-point update
The October 13 entry-point fix closed the documented unauthenticated route; the companion vulnerabilities remained separately affected. These are the fixed-release pairs in Ivanti’s current table for both CVE-2026-111357 and CVE-2026-118527. Record the exact running build after maintenance, not just the downloaded package or a successful change ticket.
| Release line | Listed affected builds | Companion fixed release |
|---|---|---|
25.1.1 | 25.1.1.2 and prior | 25.1.1.3 |
22.8 | 22.8R2.5 and prior | 22.8R2.6 |
Use the complete vendor advisory for other branches, supported hardware, virtual/cloud templates, and migration requirements. This table is not a universal version threshold or a recommendation to downgrade. Ivanti’s older CVE-2026-104935 fix table is separate.
CISA’s catalog lists November 2 for CVE-2026-111357 and November 13 for CVE-2026-118527. CISA also marks the CVE-2026-111357 entry for forensic triage. The due dates and required actions apply within the relevant U.S. federal agency scope. Other organizations should prioritize the confirmed exploitation according to exposure and incident evidence, rather than treating the dates as waiting periods.
Keep three receipts before closing the response
The running fix
Appliance, branch, running build, advisory revision, maintenance time, and the person who verified the result.
The credential scope
Gateway service accounts, stored secrets, accessible directory data, downstream permissions, and investigation findings.
The recovery decision
Preserved evidence, containment, reset/rebuild decision, credential actions, remaining gaps, and approval to restore service.
Coordinate containment with the service owner. Preserve available volatile and external evidence without postponing necessary isolation. If compromise is suspected or confirmed, use the vendor’s incident-recovery procedure, not a patch-only closeout. Plan secret replacement and downstream review with the relevant owners, using the incident evidence and vendor recovery scope.
For suspected or confirmed compromise, Ivanti’s recovery guidance calls for a factory reset of the physical appliance, or a new deployment for a virtual/cloud appliance, followed by the latest release. It also calls for resetting account passwords, revoking and reissuing stored certificates, and resetting stored API keys and license-server credentials. Preserve evidence and coordinate the sequence with the response team. Current vendor recovery instructions; CISA’s updated response guidance.
Hunt across the gateway and the systems behind it
The useful question is which evidence can answer each part of the intrusion. A login-URL match alone is not exploit detection, and a quiet endpoint console does not establish that a VPN appliance was clean.
| Question | Evidence to inspect | How to read the result |
|---|---|---|
Was an unexpected handler selected? | Captured HTTP requests to /dana-na/auth/url_default/welcome.cgi, including X-DSCGI-PATH where collected. | Compare the routing target with expected handling. Normal login traffic uses the URL too. Ordinary access/flow logs may omit the necessary header. |
Did the published host reach us? | Firewall/session history for 108[.]165[.]147[.]64, with time, direction, gateway destination, and NAT context. | Volexity’s investigation lead, not proof of attribution or compromise. Check contemporaneous use; hosting addresses can change hands. |
What did a gateway identity reach? | Directory and target-system records for actual gateway service accounts and observed source addresses. | Review successful access as well as failures. LDAP use can be normal; attribute-level reads require appropriate audit visibility. |
What survives on the appliance? | Authorized memory/filesystem collection, available core dumps, and artifacts identified by Volexity. | A missing file or clean integrity check does not answer the earlier-compromise question. |
The request and artifact leads come from Volexity; its indicator repository provides the original list. We have not validated this exploit chain in our research fleet. Do not install unsupported EDR software on the appliance to satisfy a hunting checklist.
The routing-header check requires an actual captured header and knowledge of expected handling. Before turning a hunting prompt into an alert, verify that the event source records the required evidence. Use the worksheet to assign the owner of any collection gap.
If this VPN reaches operations, follow the access
This is an edge-appliance issue, not a reported compromise of an industrial controller. Where the gateway or its identities can reach engineering workstations, vendor-support hosts, historians, or operational directories, include those paths in the investigation.
Remote-access gateway
Which identities, secrets, and routes did it hold?
Systems those identities can use
Who checks the activity and verifies restored trust?
An isolated decoy on a path with no routine use can add a warning signal to this design. Commission its placement, retained records, and responder handoff. It supports the investigation; it does not replace fixes or identity recovery.
Take the closeout worksheet
A two-page record for the platform, identity, and response owners. Use it to separate “updated” from “investigated,” and record the evidence behind reopening access.
Which systems still trust your VPN’s accounts?
If your team needs help testing a decoy placement and the evidence handoff into its existing tools, talk with Deception Check.
Sources and method
- Ivanti advisory, updated October 29: separate CVE tables, branch-specific fixes, and recovery guidance.
- CISA KEV catalog: October 30 additions, November 2/13 due dates, and individual vulnerability descriptions.
- Volexity incident investigation: observed activity and forensic findings. Its October 29 update announces the escalation fix; its original body retains historical patch status.
- Our October 14 response note: the original evidence-retention discussion.
Primary information checked October 31. The chain diagram simplifies reported behavior; it is not our capture or an exploit reproduction. Recovery and upgrade choices must match the current vendor procedure and the actual appliance.
