Deception Check

THE DECEPTION CHECK BESTIARY

Meet the Prospector

GPU appraisal and claim jumping in the compute gold rush

Deception Check Research · 5 minute read · Research field note

Watch the repeated survey, then a separate session that tries to clear existing miner files and processes.

Deception Check's animated Cryptominer Operator, representing the Prospector behavior archetypeThe Prospector character holding a pickaxe
THE PROSPECTOR
Cryptominer Operator · Bestiary archetype
80.5%of compute-appraisal sessions
Oct 6-7, 2026 (UTC)
3,348sessions repeated 8 inputs
~37sto attempted cleanup in another case

3,348 SSH sessions repeated the same eight-input pattern. Check the graphics hardware. Ask about the CPU. Identify the hosting organization. Inspect the GPUs. Then turn to miner names.

That pattern accounted for 80.5% of the 4,161 sessions in our October 6 and 7 compute-appraisal dataset. In a separate session, GPU checks gave way to attempted miner removal in about 37 seconds.

Meet the Prospector, our Deception Check Bestiary character for cryptomining operators and compute hunters. Your compute is the claim. The visitor wants to know what it offers, and sometimes whether someone else has already staked it.

An appraisal in eight moves

The repeated sequence begins with PCI hardware inspection, checking VGA and 3D devices. It asks for the CPU model, then queries an external IP-information service for the hosting organization. NVIDIA product checks follow, then a Radeon check. The final input contains a loop fragment naming familiar miners.

Eight recorded inputs move from graphics and CPU inspection through hosting and GPU checks to miner-name references.

A single GPU query could be routine administration. The ordered sequence tells a richer story: what hardware is available, where it is hosted, and whether the environment may already involve mining.

This gives defenders a behavioral fingerprint they can follow across changing addresses. Repetition makes the pattern useful for grouping activity; it does not require treating every matching visitor as the same operator.

RECORDED ATTACKER INPUT · 2026-10-07 UTC

Replay A The appraisal routine

Follow the repeated hardware and hosting survey through its miner-name references.

Animated evidence replay of graphics, CPU, hosting, NVIDIA, Radeon and miner-name queries.
Recorded input in order. Elapsed times are original; playback is paced for reading.
Read this replay as text

Recorded submitted inputs, not proof of execution. Elapsed times are original.

  1. Graphics discoverylspci | egrep VGAVGA device inspection
  2. Graphics discoverylspci | grep 3D3D device inspection
  3. CPU discoverylscpu | egrep "Model name:" | cut -d ' ' -f 14-CPU model query
  4. Hosting contextcurl ipinfo.io/orgExternal hosting-organization lookup
  5. Graphics discoverynvidia-smi -q | grep "Product Name" | awk '{print $4, $5, $6, $7, $8, $9, $10, $11}' | wc -l | head -c 1Count NVIDIA product-name results
  6. Graphics discoverynvidia-smi -q | grep "Product Name"List NVIDIA product names
  7. Graphics discoverylspci | egrep VGA | grep Radeon | wc -l | head -c 1Count Radeon matches
  8. Miner-name referencesfor proc in xmrig cpuminer minerd ccminerLoop fragment only; body not in export

Watch the order of the questions in this representative session. The final miner-name fragment ends before a loop body, so the replay stops where the evidence stops.

This was not our first sighting of compute hunting. Summaries of our log archives show mining and appraisal activity back to July, with approximately 860,000 matching command records across the surveyed archives. That is the broader backdrop; the eight-input finding comes from the focused October dataset.

Claim jumping after the survey

In another October 7 session, the visitor checks graphics devices and NVIDIA product names. About 37 seconds after the first GPU check, it submits file-removal commands naming xmrig, .diicot, .black, and Opera, followed by two attempts to terminate XMRig processes.

RECORDED ATTACKER INPUT · 2026-10-07 UTC

Replay B From GPU checks to attempted cleanup

A different session moves from graphics discovery to file removal and XMRig termination attempts.

Animated evidence replay of GPU discovery followed by miner-associated file removal and XMRig termination attempts.
Recorded input in order. Elapsed times are original; playback is paced for reading.
Read this replay as text

Recorded submitted inputs, not proof of execution. Elapsed times are original.

  1. Graphics discoverylspci | egrep VGAVGA device inspection
  2. Graphics discoverylspci | grep 3D3D device inspection
  3. Graphics discoverynvidia-smi -q | grep "Product Name" | awk '{print $4, $5, $6, $7, $8, $9, $10, $11}' | wc -l | head -c 1Count NVIDIA product-name results
  4. Graphics discoverynvidia-smi -q | grep "Product Name"List NVIDIA product names
  5. Attempted cleanuprm -rf xmrig .diicot .black OperaRemove miner-associated files
  6. Attempted cleanuprm -rf .black xmrig.1Additional miner-associated file removal
  7. Attempted cleanuppkill xmrigAttempt to terminate XMRig processes
  8. Attempted cleanupkillall xmrigSecond termination command

The activity has shifted from appraisal to attempted interference. Those commands could clear a rival installation or clean up an earlier deployment of the same tooling. Either way, the transition gives an analyst something more useful than a generic discovery alert.

On a production system, unexpected cleanup can threaten workloads and remove evidence of an earlier compromise. The immediate question becomes: what did this session attempt, what actually happened, and how did it gain access?

A recognizable trail

Darktrace's Diicot research describes SSH compromise followed by hardware and hosting discovery, preparation for mining, and removal of prior compromise artifacts. Its execution chain includes .diicot and Opera.

A public sandbox report submitted in February 2026 provides a closer match: its process trace contains the same multi-name file cleanup and XMRig termination commands seen in our October session, with only whitespace variation in one command.

That makes Diicot-associated tooling a useful comparison for the cleanup case. It does not identify the operator behind the larger appraisal wave. A SOC can hunt the behavior now without waiting for that attribution question to be settled.

Map the behavior before naming the outcome

ATT&CK evidence graphic: hardware discovery maps to T1082; submitted shell commands map to attempted T1059.004; resource hijacking remains a downstream objective. Miner cleanup is retained as observed behavior without an automatic defense-evasion mapping.

Hardware enumeration maps to System Information Discovery, T1082. Shell inputs map to attempted Unix Shell activity, T1059.004. Resource Hijacking, T1496 is the downstream concern: an unauthorized workload consuming someone else's compute.

The decoys preserve submitted commands. Production telemetry must establish whether those commands executed and whether a workload followed. This distinction keeps a useful early warning from becoming an unsupported claim of successful mining.

Hunt the transition

For Linux systems, GPU workers, and AI infrastructure, start with an unexpected remote session that combines hardware inspection with an external hosting lookup. Join the access event to the destination host, account, process tree, and time; then follow what happens next.

Prioritize miner termination, file removal, new persistence, unusual outbound connections, and workload changes. Preserve the full command line, parent process, working directory, timestamps, and action results. Approved GPU-health agents and provisioning scripts belong in precise exceptions, not a blanket suppression of GPU utilities.

If cleanup or an unauthorized workload is present, preserve evidence before removing artifacts. Determine the access path and check credential exposure and persistence. Killing a miner does not close the entry point.

You can also test the early warning safely. Run benign inventory commands on an authorized test host and check whether the SOC reconstructs their order. Exercise destructive-cleanup detections with synthetic telemetry or in an isolated lab. The replays here display recorded evidence; they never execute the commands.

See the survey before the workload

Deception creates a place where an unfamiliar visitor has no legitimate business reason to inventory the machinery. That makes the survey itself useful, before a defender has a miner binary or an expensive workload to investigate.

The Prospector gives this behavior a memorable face. Our goal is to turn its recognizable sequence into a detection your team can test and a record your responders can use.

Watch what an unfamiliar session measures, and what it tries to remove afterward.

Research notes

The focused dataset covers October 6 and 7, 2026, UTC: 31,055 selected command records, grouped by decoy and session ID and ordered by timestamp, with identical exported rows checked. The repeated pattern occurs in 3,348 of 4,161 such groups. Historical archive summaries use broader mining/appraisal matching; their approximately 860,000 records are not repetitions of this sequence or a count of attacks. The replays are different sessions, with recorded elapsed times and reveal pacing adjusted for reading. Records preserve submitted input rather than verified operating-system execution. Source addresses, decoy names, credentials, and internal identifiers are omitted.

Appraisal replay (GIF)Cleanup replay (GIF)Replay transcripts (TXT)